Corporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, and Their Effects on Financial Performance by Hykaj, Kristal
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.25  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
46 
Corporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, and 




Kristal Hykaj, PhD Candidate  
Epoka University, Albania 
 
doi: 10.19044/esj.2016.v12n25p46    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n25p46 
 
Abstract 
 This paper studies the 105 U.S. Equity Real Estate Investment 
Trusts for the period of 2007-2012, and explores the relationship between 
corporate governance, institutional ownership, and financial performance. 
The results are conclusive and show that the presence of women on the 
board of directors as well as the choice to opt for a classified board 
enhances the returns on assets and returns on equity. The second finding of 
this paper is that the percentage of stocks owned by the top 10 institutions, 
between the levels of 30% and 50%, are associated with higher returns on 
assets and returns on equity. 
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Introduction 
 This paper focuses on the impact of corporate governance and the 
presence of large institutional shareholders on the financial performance of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The field of corporate governance and 
how it affects a firm’s performance has been widely studied by several 
authors. Bauer et al. (2009) conducted a research where they used a database 
of 5000 US firms. Thus, they found a strong and solid evidence of the effects 
of corporate governance on the financial performance of these firms. The 
authors, however, concluded that due to REITs having a special regulatory 
environment, the effects of corporate governance is limited. Yet, Fend et al. 
(2009) constructed a corporate governance index where they included the size 
of the board, the duality of the Chief Executive Officer’s duties, and the 
presence of outside directors in the high boardroom. Subsequently, their 
conclusion was that such indicators have a positive and significant impact on 
the financial performance of firms as measured by the returns on assets. 
 Institutional ownership is another field where a lot of academic work 
has been carried out. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) were among the first to 
recognize the great incentives that institutional investors have in monitoring 




the management of firms. Thus, this is because the size of the investment is 
generally very large, which means that the monitoring costs will not be out 
weighted by the benefits of eliminating deviant managerial behaviors. 
Following the same line of reasoning, the paper released by Gorssman and 
Hart (1980) noted that the monitoring costs must not be underestimated and 
only large institutional holders are able to reap economic benefits from 
continuously monitoring the top management. 
 In spite of the forgoing research papers, there still remains a lack of 
academic research regarding the effect of the presence of women on the board 
of directors of REITs. This paper attempts to fill this gap. In this paper, we 
constructed a corporate governance index where we included the following 
as the main variables: CEO entrenchment, the choice of having a staggered 
Board of Directors, and the presence of women in the Board of Directors. 
 Secondly, this paper studied the effect of institutional ownership on 
company performance. Though this field has been extensively researched, this 
paper differs from other papers in that it did not focus on the absolute number 
of institutional holders. Furthermore, this paper only used the percentage of 
the top 10 institutional holders. The outline of the paper is as follows. In 
Section II, we will provide a detailed review of the current literature regarding 
corporate governance and institutional ownership, and their effects on 
company performance. In subsequent sections, we present our hypothesis that 
we will test. In Section IV, the data used for the research and the methodology 
applied are described. In the last section, we conclude on this research. 
 
Literature Review 
 Many authors have researched the effects that corporate governance 
has on a firm’s performance. The main idea is that the presence of a qualitative 
corporate governance environment in a firm will lead to better performance 
resulting in shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, this notion was 
supported by Core et al. (2006) and Gompers et al. (2003). 
 Campbell et al. (2009) stated that CEOs with longer tenures are more 
entrenched and less subject to discipline, which increases the firm’s agency 
problems. Masulis et al. (2007) concluded that CEO duality is negatively 
related to a firm’s value and performance. In a study conducted by Weisbach 
(1998), it was shown that CEOs become more entrenched during their career, 
resulting in the investment of higher bargaining powers in the board of 
directors. This ultimately influences the board’s composition in favor of less 
external directors. The evidence reported by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
is in line with the foregoing study. However, CEO entrenchment can be 
explained not only by tenure, but also by the institutional requirements present 
in the American legislature. To qualify as a REIT, at least 75 percent of the 
total assets must be real estate assets, cash and cash items, and U.S. 
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government obligations. This restriction halts the possibility of inter-industry 
mergers and diversification types of investments. It offers a rather limited 
chance for investors to jump from other industries to the real estate industry, 
thus making the CEO position of a REIT as a relatively small market. 
Furthermore, it also means that current CEOs have all the incentives in place 
to try and “shield” themselves from external acquisitions. 
 The market for corporate control functions in such a way that it 
“punishes” poorly performing managers. When other firms or institutions see 
the opportunity to capitalize on positive or untapped projects and create 
positive synergies through an acquisition, they would not hesitate to engage 
in a hostile takeover. The mere existence of the threat, in theory, would 
discipline managers and make them perform adequately so as to eliminate 
such a risk. Nevertheless, Campbell et al. (2001) collected data for eighty-five 
mergers between publicly traded equity REITs and public/private target 
REITS in the 1990s. Also, they reported that all the deals were friendly and 
not a single one was a hostile takeover. This fact does stress the importance 
of independent and unaffiliated directors being present in the board so as to 
protect the interest of minority shareholders and third parties. Moreover, 
REITs are subject to the 5-50 rule which states that “five or fewer individuals 
cannot own more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding beneficial interest 
in the organization at any time during the last half of any tax year.” Any shares 
that are acquired or controlled in excess of this provision will lose all voting 
privileges and be entitled only to economical remunerations. Being entities 
that generally invest in long-term projects (due to the nature of the real estate 
sector), the provision of potentially having more than 5 individuals for the first 
half of the year is at best symbolic. A related rule states that REITs must have 
“100 or more beneficial owners for 335 days of a full year.” Therefore, the 
two rules mentioned above could potentially hurt the performance of firms 
because they do limit the ability to acquire a block holding percentage of 
shares. Requiring a diversified ownership base makes coordination and 
communication among shareholders a challenge. Furthermore, it lowers the 
chances of them forming alliances to govern the REIT and ultimately 
minimizes their ability to take actions against deviant manager behaviors. 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) identified independent directors to be very 
crucial and important for monitoring managers’ activity. Specifically for 
REITs, a study conducted by Friday and Sirmans (1998) reported a positive 
relationship between the performance of an entity and a large independent 
director representation. Friday and Sirman (1998) proved in their research that 
there exists a positive effect between market-to-book ratio and the presence of 
outside directors in the board, specifically for REITs. Based on their work, one 
can conclude that an independent board is more likely to be associated with 
higher NPV projects. But for the REIT industry, this is not guaranteed because 




the regulator constraints require a real estate expertise and not just a general 
managerial ability to achieve positive returns on investments. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) conclude that “there is little to suggest that board 
composition has any cross-sectional relationship with firm performance.” 
 The legal requirements to which REITs have to adhere to, granted 
them distinct features when compared with other firms. However, the internal 
structure of REITs has undergone major changes in the last two decades. A 
study conducted by Ling and Ryangert (1997) showed that REITs of the 1990s 
have a higher level of insider and institutional shareholding. They display a 
different management style and organizational structure. According to Ling 
and Ryngaert (1997), such changes have crucial implications when it comes 
to firm valuation. This is because a greater presence of institutional holders 
could facilitate takeover, lower monitoring costs for smaller shareholders, and 
increase management scrutiny. Ultimately, REITs could benefit from a 
reputational spillover of having large investors investing in their company. 
Chan et al. (1998) documented a very interesting trend. During the 1990s, 
institutional investors have invested more in REITs than they have in any other 
type of stock. According to their results, such ownership change have had a 
positive impact on a firm’s performance. 
 According to Feng et al. (2005), two of the main characteristics of 
qualitative corporate governance are the size and the presence of outside 
directors. Starting with the size, it has been observed generally that a smaller 
board is more able to deliver better financial performance and is associated 
with better and faster decision making. Certainly, it is easier for a smaller 
board to agree on the implementation of defensive mechanisms e.g. poison 
pills and to set CEO’s compensation. The process of appointing and/or 
removing a CEO is also faster and more effective. Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
concluded that “firms with small boards have better financial ratios and 
presents stronger monitoring to CEOs.” This relationship is present in small 
firms. Consequently, one of the most widely used measures of investment 
performance is Tobin’s Q. Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship 
between this indicator and board size, implying better investment decisions 
for smaller boards of directors. The relationship also holds beyond the 
American shores as shown by Mak and Kusmandi (2004) in their research 
about Singaporean and Malaysian firms. Feng et al. (2005) found that “smaller 
boards are associated with higher 5-year average returns on assets.” Campbell 
et al. (2009) found that larger boards are less effective in monitoring the 
management of the firm. Jensen (1993) concluded that large boards suffer 
from the lack of cohesion and coordination, resulting in slow decision making 
and an inability to voice disapproval concerning deviant managerial behaviors. 
 Therefore, the second characteristic that influences the credibility and 
decision making quality of the board is the presence of independent directors. 
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Their presence is very important for the monitoring purposes as they are not 
affiliated with the enterprise in any other form apart from their directorship. 
In theory, the appointment of such directors would means that the interest of 
the minority shareholders is safeguarded and so is the viability of the 
enterprise. Thus, because they are not employees of the firm, the CEO’s 
influence on them is thought to be rather limited. Cotter et al. (1997) conducted 
a research on the role of independent directors during a takeover attempt. Their 
research identifies a positive effect on the “offer premium, bid premium 
revision, and target gains” during the takeover process. They concluded that 
the presence of independent directors does indeed “enhance target shareholder 
gains.” In an earlier study, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) proved the existence 
of a positive relationship between stock price reactions and the appointment 
of independent directors. They attributed such a positive market reaction to 
the expected increase in the quality of monitoring performed by the board on 
the CEO. In addition, the committees are another aspect where the 
appointment of outside directors has positive effects. According to Klien 
(1998), the quality and effectiveness of committees are far better with a larger 
presence of independent directors. Yet, Feng et al. (2005) found that the 
“presence of outside directors has a weak impact on firm’s performance.” 
Bhagat and Black (2002) conducted a research that stretched from the 1980s 
to the early 2000s and concluded that “the impact of the board of directors on 
performance is anything but resolved.” They argued that asking the board 
members to focus solely on monitoring tasks comes with a trade-off. Hence, 
they will be required to perform less advisory duties which could in itself, 
diminish shareholders’ wealth instead of increasing it. 
 Generally, there is a consensus in the literature on this subject 
regarding the relationship between firm’s performance and ownership by 
directors and managers (Kim et al., 1988; Pfeffer, 1972; and Vance, 1964). 
Schellenger et al. (1989) found a positive relationship between stockholding 
of directors and various measures of performance. Oswald and Jahera (1991) 
presented evidence in their study that showed a significant relationship 
between ownership and financial performance. More recently, Khorana et al. 
(2007) examined the impact of ownership on fund performance, and 
concluded that future risk-adjusted returns are related to managerial 
ownership. Smith and Watts (1992) argued that restricted investment 
opportunities per se help mitigate agency problems due to the inability of 
managers to diversify into different business areas. As such, the REIT industry 
allows for the proper evaluation of the performance of the CEO and the 
managing team through firm’s performance. This is because their motivation 
variation is nearly eliminated and the set of investment opportunities that they 
face is rather limited compared to a normal entity or an M-form organization. 
Nevertheless, that does not eliminate the moral hazards and the desire to reap 




high economical profits. Jensen (1986) developed the so-called “free cash 
theory.” According to this theory, agency problem is severe in companies 
where the CEO and the managerial body have access to significant amounts 
of cash flows. REITs operate in the real estate sector, and the rental income 
comprises of a substantial part of the total income and as such would 
potentially give a big pool of funds to managers which they could abuse. To 
compound the problem, REITs do not pay taxes. However, the regulatory 
environment tackles this problem through a provision where it is required to 
pay out “at least 90% of taxable income.” This eliminates to a certain extent 
the problem described by Jensen (1986). It may also reduce the incentive to 
have a large portion of the board composed of outside directors. According to 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2004), dividends and board monitoring can be considered 
as substitutes for each other. This implies that a high level of cash 
disbursement lowers the need for having an independent board of directors. 
 A potential solution to ensure that managers are enlightened about 
shareholders is to grant stock ownership to the former. This seems like a very 
good option and would lower the cost of constantly monitoring CEOs on 
behalf of shareholders. However, the academic findings show a weak 
relationship between insiders, more specifically CEOs and highly ranked 
managers, and positive, or even sub-normal performance. Friday et al. (1999) 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between market-to-book ratios 
and insider ownership, only that it is holds true for low levels of ownership. 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) conducted a study of 122 US equity REITs and 
reached the conclusion that block ownership, independent directors, and 
institutional ownership do not significantly affect nor do they strongly enhance 
a company’s performance. They found a weak relationship between 
performance enhancement and outside director representation on the board of 
director of REITs. Institutional ownership failed to serve, in their view, as an 
“alternative discipline mechanism” that would offset potential inadequate 
monitoring by outside directors. They also concluded that CEOs do “exert a 
greater influence both on the board composition and performance, than outside 
directors do.” This later finding can explain the fact that REIT CEO 
compensation is higher on average for boards where monitoring is weak. 
Hence, the board is composed of a larger number of directors who are 
generally old.  
 
Hypotheses 
 Based on the summary of literature, we developed two hypotheses to 
be tested: 
1. Because literature had no consensus on the effect of corporate 
governance, we developed an Index where we included a variable that 
captured the presence of women on the Board of Directors. This topic had 
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not been investigated in the context of REITs before.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to do so  
2. We tested the effect of institutional ownership on the financial 
performance of companies. The institutional ownership level was not taken 
at absolute levels, but we concentrated on the top 10 institutional holders. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Summary Statistics 
 Summary statistics of 105 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are 
presented on a yearly basis from 2007 to 2012 in Table I (a-g). There was a 
total of 21 REITs who invested in apartments, 12 are diversified, 6 focused on 
healthcare, 12 invested in hotels, 15 in offices, 11 in others, and 28 invested 
mostly in retail. First, the study found that the REIT board (BRDSIZE) had an 
average of 8 board members which lines up with the findings of Campbell et 
al. (2009). Regarding the average number of outsiders (NMOUTSIDER) 
present in the board, the above mentioned paper differs from this paper in that 
it was 5; whereas in this paper, it was 7. The percentage of outsiders 
(PCTOUTSIDER) siting in REIT boards was 85.50% which lines up with 
conventional firms as reported by Ferry (1999), and is higher than those 
reported for the REITs in other studies. This indicator clearly shows the 
influence of the growing academic work that “sponsors” an outside 
denominated board. At the same time, the legal framework in the United States 
has been changing in favor of increasing the quality of corporate governance, 
especially for large public corporations. Following the demise of major global 
companies such an Enron and WorldCom due to accounting scandals and 
other inappropriate ethical work, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was approved by 
the American legislation. However, the aim of such acts is to reduce such 
inefficiencies. The late financial crisis led to the Dodd-Frankly Act, which is 
another legislative piece that tries to reduce deviant behavior among top 
ranked corporate managers. Following the board of directors descriptive 
results, the database used for this research showed that nearly one-fourth of 
them are staggered boards (STGRDBRD). This confirmed the view that the 
hostile takeover market is nearly inexistent in the REIT industry. 
 This paper revealed another variable that is lacking in other academic 
work on the subject, which is the average period of time that board members 
(TENUREBRD) serve in their positions. For the 105 companies that were 
investigated, the tenure stood at nearly 10 years. The average tenure of the 
CEO (CEO_TENURE) stood at 9 years. A REITs board member’s mandate 
is generally four years. However, on the average, they spend twice as much 
time in this position. Certainly, being part of the company for such a long 
period of time creates problem in terms of board efficiency. As reported by 
Feng et al. (2005), many directors are chosen and/or designated by the CEO. 




In the database used for the construction of this paper, the number of board 
members who joined after the appointment of the CEO was 364 or 42% of 
the serving directors as of 31st of December, 2012. Therefore, they have either 
been appointed directly by the CEO or have been active in their selection 
procedure. 
 CEO duality (CEO_CHAIRMAN), meaning that the Chief Executive 
Officer serves as the Chairman of the board as well, was presented to be 
around 50% (Campbell et al., 2009). This study showed that this ratio has 
dropped to 39%, which is a slight but not significant change. Furthermore, this 
study views CEO entrenchment from two other innovative perspectives. First, 
it investigated the percentage of CEOs who aside from being the chief 
executive officer, were also founders of the company (CEO_FOUNDER). It 
was discovered that from a sample of 105 REITs that the ratio stood at 10%. 
Secondly, this study investigated the number of CEOs who served as 
Chairman in addition to founding the company 
(CEO_CHAIRMAN_FOUNDER). The ratio stood at 8%. The numbers 
indicate that even though REITs are a closed-end fund specialized only in one 
investment segment and for which specific management abilities are required, 
the different combination of CEO entrenchment are below the fifty percent 
threshold. Furthermore, the trend is towards a lower CEO entrenchment. 
 In order to align the interests of the principals (shareholders) and 
agents (managers), it was argued (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) that granting 
ownership in the form of stocks to the CEO and other highly ranked managers 
would ensure that they do not misbehave. Instead, they would “chase” down 
positive projects because they would profit financially themselves. The 
insider ownership (INSIDER_OWN) level stands close to 8%. Normally, in a 
publicly traded U.S corporation having more than 5% of the outstanding 
shares, grants to the holder a so-called blocking percentage. However, this 
number must be interpreted cautiously and in the light of the other variables 
concerning REITs. It is not necessarily a bad sign, especially in the absence 
of hostile takeovers. On the contrary, such a high percentage of insider 
ownership can help facilitate transactions. 
 Institutional ownership is perceived as a positive indicator for both the 
company and minority shareholders. Being generally very large financial 
institutions and having access to excessive amounts of capital, they can affect 
the reputation of a corporation and help reduce its borrowing costs, thereby 
facilitating access to money markets. In this study, institutional ownership 
refers to the top ten institutional holders (INSTITUT_OWN). The average 
institutional ownership was close to 32%. The ratio has been increasing 
dramatically from 17% in 2009 to 50% at the end of 2012. Thus, the reason 
this study focuses on the top 10 institutional holders is due to coordination in 
terms of decision making. Tying this finding with the ownership test, which is 
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as required by the U.S. legislation, a REIT must have at least 100 owners. 
Therefore, having such a threshold is a logical and suitable one. The average 
number of institutional holders is much higher. At around 180, it further 
strengthens the decision making ability of the top 10 institutional holders. 
Thus, the institutional holders owning one-third of the outstanding stock does 
not grant them pure and numerical control. However, it allows for effective 
control. As such, these investors can agree to appoint or remove CEOs when 
they find it reasonable to do so. As expected, the higher the percentage of 
institutional ownership, the lower the percentage of the insider’s stake in the 
firm. 
 The introduction of a mandatory requirement of having a women on 
the board of directors of all Norwegian firms led to an underperformance of 
the companies and the damaging of the performing ability of the board of 
directors. A 2012 report published by Credit Suisse provided conclusive 
evidence that showed the positive effect of the presence of free-will women 
on the board of directors. Therefore, to further study the effects of women, the 
researcher included a dummy variable (WOMENBRD) that describes the 
funds that have at least a women on board and those that do not. From 105 
REITs that were investigated, only 3 have a woman as a Chief Executive 
Officer. Also, an overall of 83 women were serving on the boards. It is very 
interesting to note that the background of two-third of the women serving as 
board members was not real estate. The average tenure of the female board 
members was 5 years (TENUREWOMEN), which is half of the entire REIT 
average. Furthermore, there is a big concentration of women being appointed 
as REITs board members for the first time only in the last decade. As of 2012, 
forty-five Real Estate Investment Trusts did not have women on their boards. 
 As an indicator of financial performance, the returns on average on 
assets (ROAA) was used. The variable was calculated as net income as a 
percent of average assets. For the year 2007, the ROAA was calculated using 
the net income of 2007 and the assets value of 2006 and 2007. The same 
calculation methodology was used for the coming years, up to 2012. The 
average of the return on assets (return on average of assets and returns on 
assets are used interchangeably in this paper) for the period 2007-2012 was 
2.01%. The higher value was recorded at 3.73% for 2007, and the lowest value 
was 0.79% for the year 2009. Subsequently, a second indicator is the return 
on average of equity (ROAE). The variable was calculated as net income as a 
percentage of average equity. For the year 2007, the ROAE was calculated 
using the net income of 2007 and the equity value of 2006 and 2007. The same 
calculation methodology was used for the coming years up to 2012. The 
average of the returns on equity (return on average of equity and return on 
equity are used interchangeably in this paper) for the period 2007 to 2012 was 
4.59%. The higher value was 12.88% in 2007, while the lowest value was 




1.07% in 2009. This indicated a very large variety which is not only due to the 
financial crisis, but also due to the changes in the ownership structure as well. 
 Therefore, to avoid any statistical insignificance, the market 
capitalization (MARKETCAP), which is on average $2.8 billion, and the 
liabilities ratio (TD/TA), which stands at an average of 0.53%, were used as 
control variables. 
 
Univariate Analysis: Corporate Governance Index 
 Bauer et al. (2009) conducted a study of 5000 US companies and 
found a strong and positive relationship between the corporate governance 
index they used. They also find the financial performance, which is measured 
by several variables. When performing the same test on a sub-set of 
companies composed out of REITs, the author found no significant 
relationship between the corporate governance index and the financial 
performance. The explanation for such a finding relates to the fact that REITs 
operate in a very restrictive regulatory environment, and as such, the effect of 
corporate governance does not translate into higher financial performance. On 
the other hand, a study conducted by Feng et al. (2005) followed the same 
principle. In order to construct their corporate governance index, they use 
three variables: a) board size, b) CEO duality, and c) the presence of outside 
directors in the board of directors. The results presented by the authors showed 
that firms with a higher corporate governance index were “associated with a 
higher 5-year average ROA.” The review of literature is certainly mixed, and 
no solid conclusion can be drawn so far. This paper attempts to bring further 
evidence regarding the effect of corporate governance on firm’s performance. 
 In order to capture the effects of corporate governance and to see its 
relationship with the financial performance of the fund, the author constructed 
the Corporate Governance Index (CG-Index). First, the CEO entrenchment is 
included. Masulis et al. (2007) concluded that CEO duality is negatively 
related to a firm’s value and performance. Therefore, the same conclusion was 
reached by Feng et al. (2005). The reason why CEO entrenchment is part of 
Corporate Governance was due to the fact that a CEO who takes on the task 
of the Chairman of the Board is too powerful. He has the ability to influence 
decision making which could by itself potentially hurt the performance of the 
firm. Two other studies, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Weisbach (1998), 
found evidence that the Chief Executive Officer becomes more entrenched 
throughout his career if his tenure is long. This would mean that the bargaining 
power of the board members would be lower relative to that of the CEO who 
would later ultimately be able to affect the composition of the board. In this 
study, the characteristic of a founding CEO was added. The reason for such an 
inclusion is that if a CEO is a founder, he has “natural” ties with the firm and 
with the employees. In a dear situation, this could be a very good thing because 
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the individual can symbolize leadership and affect the firm for good. In other 
cases, the relationship can work in the opposite direction. If the Chief 
Executive Officer performs only this task and sits in the board of the directors 
without being the Chairman, 1 point is added to the CG-Index. If the CEO is 
also the Chairman of the board or is one of the founders, 0.5 point is added to 
the CG-Index. If the CEO is the Chairman of the board and is one of the 
founders of the entity, 0 point is added to the CG-Index. 
 Bebchuk et al. (2010) concluded that the presence of a staggered board 
is negatively related to a firm’s valuation. The findings are supported by the 
studies of Faleye (2007) and Masulis et al. (2007). Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that their study was conducted on normal corporations and not on 
REITs. The results are understandable because a staggered board does indeed 
lower the ability for takeovers to be completed successfully. Therefore, it 
could jeopardize the firm’s value from this angle. However, the results need 
not be true to a universal level. The REIT environment is very different. There 
is virtually no hostile takeover market and as such, the presence of a classified 
board does not hurt the firm’s value. Therefore, it is interesting to see the effect 
of a classified board of directors on the financial performance of REITs. In 
addition, the presence of a classified board adds 1 point to the CG-Index, 
otherwise 0 is added. 
 Nielsen and Huse (2010) argued that group diversity can lead to 
potential increases in the levels of conflicts. On the other side, the authors 
recognized that based on gender theories, “women are more sensitive towards 
the needs of others, better able to resolve interpersonal conflicts, and often 
engages in more participative leadership styles.” Luckerath-Rovers (2010) 
conducted a study of 99 Dutch listed companies and found that companies 
with female board members do indeed perform better than those without one. 
Furthermore, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) argued that higher financial 
performances can be achieved because the presence of women on the board of 
directors is a “consequence of a more innovative, modern, and transparent 
enterprise.” Another positive effect of increased female board members was 
reported by Rose (2007) who indicated that “female employees are more 
motivated” to perform better on the job. In a report titled ‘Gender Diversity 
and Corporate Performance’ which was published in 2012 by the Credit Suisse 
Research Institute, it was noted that the female board members have a 
significant effect on company’s performance. The study was conducted on 
2500 U.S. firms for the period of 2006 to 2011. The paper showed that 
companies with at least a women on the board had a ROE of 16% for a period 
of 6 years, while the companies that had no woman on the board had a ROE 
of 12% for the period of 2006 to 2011. 
 This paper made an attempt to see the effect of the female board 
members, whether it has a positive or negative relationship with financial 




performance (see Table V). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that uses such a variable as part of its corporate governance indicators in the 
Real Estate Investment Trusts of firm samples. The presence of women on the 
board of directors is signaled with 1 point, while the absence is 0 point. 
 The funds were separated into three groups. CG-Index = 3 was 
composed out of 33 funds. This group scored 3 out of 3 in terms of the CG-
Index. The average return on assets for the period 2007 to 2012 was 3.17%. 
Group 2, CG-Index = 2, was composed out of 51 funds. This group scored 2 
out of 3 in terms of the Corporate Governance Index and had a return on 
average on assets of 1.98%. The last group, CG-Index = 1, was composed out 
of 21 companies. This group had a score of 1 and a return on assets of 1.47%, 
on average, for the period 2007 to 2012. Clearly, the improvement of the 
corporate governance quality is associated with significantly higher returns on 
assets. Yet, this is a simple univariate regression, and as such, it should not be 
taken at par value. It is used to show the sign of the relationship, while the real 
magnitude needs to be tested in other circumstances. This means that in a 
multivariate regression, other variables could potentially explain the 
outperformance and not necessarily the quality of corporate governance. 
 
Univariate Analysis: Institutional Ownership 
 Institutional ownership has been attracting a fair amount of attention 
in terms of academic work due to the monitoring tasks that they perform or 
are expected to perform on top management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
identified in their paper the greater incentive that these institutions have to 
monitor the CEOs and the management of the firm, and that this monitoring 
incentive is much higher than that of the board members. The reasoning behind 
this lies in the fact that the board members have very little or no wealth 
invested in the firm, while large investors come with considerable equity 
investments. Grossman and Hart (1980) argued that monitoring costs are, on 
average, high for big companies. Therefore, only large institutional investors 
will be able to reap the economic benefits from a constant monitoring of the 
firm’s decisions and chosen investment projects. Several studies (McConnell 
and Servaes (1990); Nesbitt (1994); and Smith (1996)) have tested 
institutional ownership effect on monitoring, and have found evidence of this 
effect. More specifically, corporate monitoring by institutional investors will 
result in better corporate performance. It will limit managers’ engagement in 
opportunistic and/or deviant managerial behavior. 
 On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of academic work 
that shows that institutional ownership and monitoring are not a positive linear 
relation. Graves and Waddock (1994) found that an increase in the level of 
institutional ownership has resulted in a decline in the performance of 
American companies. The authors argued that such a negative result is because 
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institutional holders are expected to show a constant improvement in terms of 
results. Potentially, such improvements must be in every quarter. Maug (1998) 
argued that the amount of monitoring and enforcing decisions from 
institutional holders will be proportional to the size of the shares that they 
control. From this reasoning, it can be deduced that if the percentage of shares 
controlled by the institutional holders is significantly high, shares will most 
probably be held for longer periods. Hence, their marketability will be 
lowered. This by itself will induce higher monitoring. Certainly, the inverse 
relation is also true. If an institutional investor holds a lower stake in the firm, 
he/she will look for opportunities to shorten the stock and get a grip on 
potential buy-sell price differences. Various academic papers (Bhide (1994); 
Coffee (1991); and Demirag (1998)) have concluded that institutional 
investors are motivated by two factors that outweigh the benefits of constant 
monitoring. First, desiring highly-liquid assets under their management will 
mean that they will be less willing to engage in long-term share controlling. 
Second, the desire of short-term profitability are very significant elements in 
institutional decision making framework. Apart from the activism that 
institutional holders show through constant managerial monitoring, another 
very important aspect where considerable academic work has been channeled 
is the relationship with the firm’s performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
found in their research that the ownership of institutional investors is 
associated positively with a firm’s Tobin’s Q, a widely used measurement of 
investment performance. Other studies (Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); 
Nesbitt (1994); and Smith (1996)) have found positive and statistically 
significant relationships between the presence of institutional investors and the 
performance of firms. On the other hand, studies conducted from Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) have concluded that there is no 
significant relationship between the performance of companies and the 
presence of institutional holders. 
 Moreover, this paper tackled the institutional ownership and its effect 
on company performance from a different angle. First, the industry chosen for 
study purpose was the real estate industry and the sample firms were 105 U.S. 
Real Estate Investment Trusts. Due to the regulation present in the United 
States, which applies specifically to this type of entities (see Table I), the 
results can be expected to differ from other forms of entities. The ownership 
test states that 50% of the outstanding shares of a REIT cannot be owned by 
five of fewer individuals/companies. Furthermore, a REIT is obliged to have 
at least 100 different owners of the outstanding shares. This implies a very 
disperse ownership structure. Such a structure will lead to corporations or 
group of corporations having effective control over the firm. Effective control 
is considered to be such that an individual/entity or a group of 
individuals/entities can influence decision making without controlling more 




than 50% of shares. Thus, this threshold is typically around 30% up to 50%. 
 Another benefit of having such a level of stock ownership is the limited 
monitoring that the individual/company has to perform. In this study, 
ownership was not simply taken at an absolute level. The percentage 
ownerships of the top 10 institutional holders were aggregated. The reason for 
such an approach is tied to the coordination problem. If there are 10 individual 
institutions that have a significant portion of the stake of a REIT, then the 
probability of them having a fast and well processed decision is much higher 
than having 100 shareholders and asking them to vote on a particular policy. 
Hence, this could lead to a positive spillover effect. If the large shareholders 
collude and “publicly” agree on a specific issue, then the minor shareholders 
will be more prompt to follow. This by itself is effective control, without 
paying an extra premium for it. 
 Three groups based on the percentage of the ownership level were 
created (see Table V). The first one was composed of REITs where the 
ownership level of the top 10 institutional holders stood at levels equal to or 
below 30% of the outstanding shares. The second group was composed of 
REITs where the ownership level of the top 10 institutional holders stood at 
levels equal to 30.01% and up to 50.00%. The last group was composed of 
REITs where the ownership level of the top 10 institutional holders stood at 
levels equal to more than 50.00% of the outstanding stock. It is very interesting 
to note that by 2012, only the top 10 institutional holders have built a stock 
position in the excess of 50.00%. The results are presented in Table V. The 
funds grouped in the second group constantly outperform the funds of the third 
group. The difference is largest in 2012 with more than 2.00%, in terms of 
return of assets. Consequently, there was a better performance from REITs 
where top 10 institutional holders had a position between 30% and 50%. On 
average, for the period of 2009 to 2012, the outperformance was 1.45% in 
terms of yearly returns on assets. 
 The findings confirmed the view that proportionate to their holding on 
a company, the institutional holders will engage in monitoring activities that 
lead to healthy financial results. The lack of large stock positions can be 
explained with the fact that these institutions do not want to have pure control 
of the fund. They want to be able to exercise active control which can be 
achieved in public companies with an ownership level of around 40%. Having 
a dispersed ownership structure makes it possible for such an effective control 
to be enforceable. Yet, this is a simple univariate regression; and as such, it 
should not be taken at par value. It is used to show the sign of the relationship, 
while the real magnitude needs to be tested in other circumstances. This means 
in a multivariate regression, other variables could potentially explain the 
outperformance and not necessarily the stock ownership level of the largest 
institutional holders.  
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Multivariate Regression: Corporate Governance Index 
 The authors interpret the univariate regression results as solid evidence 
of the positive effect of good corporate governance on the performance of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts. A lowly entrenched CEO, the presence of a 
classified board of directors, and the appointment of female board members 
lead to higher return on average for the study period of 2007 to 2012 for the 
105 REITs used in this paper. However, such a simple regression fails to 
capture the effect of other potentially explanatory variables. In the multivariate 
regression, the ROA is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
are the CG-Index: the size of the Board of Directors; the length of time the 
CEO has been in his current position; and the level on insider ownership. 
ROAA = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CG-INDEX + 
β4_ INSIDER_OWN +β5_MARKETCAP + β6_TD/TA + µ 
 According to Campbell et al. (2009), large boards are less effective in 
monitoring the CEO and the top management. This is simply because it is 
more difficult for them to coordinate among each other and perform their task 
thoroughly. In a study conducted by Guest (2004) using a sample of 2746 UK 
listed companies over the period of 1982 to 2002, the author found that 
“board size has a negative and strong impact on profitability.” The study used 
Tobin’s Q and share returns as measure of financial performance. The 
findings were confirmed by Feng et al. (2009) who found a positive 
relationship between small boards and better financial performance. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) concluded in their paper that “firms with small boards 
have better financial ratios and present stronger monitoring to CEOs”. 
Therefore, to see what this relationship holds in our sample, we included the 
board size (BRDSIZE) as an independent variable. To further see whether 
powerful CEOs with a longer tenure will impact the financial performance of 
firms, a variable was included in the multivariate regression 
(CEO_TENURE). 
 In order to align the interests of the principals (shareholders) and 
agents (managers), it was argued (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) that granting 
ownership in the form of stocks to the CEO and other highly ranked managers 
would ensure that they do not misbehave. Rather, they would “chase” down 
positive projects because they would profit financially themselves. Arosa et 
al. (2011) conducted a study of 586 private Spanish firms and found that 
insiders and managers become entrenched at high levels of stock ownership. 
Nonetheless, the relationship is healthy at relatively low levels of ownership 
from insiders. Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2005) found a strong and solid 
relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership at a level 
around 5% of outstanding stock. In order to capture these potential effects, the 
insider ownership level (INSIDER_OWN) was included in the equation as an 
independent variable. The market capitalization and the liabilities ratio were 




used as control variables. However, the results were summarized in Table XX. 
 For all the regressed variables, the logarithmic value was generated. 
After being converted to percentage variables, the regressions was run using 
Stata software. For the dummy variable, CG-Index, an increase in terms of 
scoring 1 leads to a yearly improvement of the return on assets of up to 0.30%. 
The result is statistically significant at a 10% significance level. The board 
size and the company performance are negatively related, confirming 
literature prediction. On an average, the increase in the board size by 1 for 
boards with a size of 10 or more will lead to a decrease in the return of assets 
equaling 1.17% on a yearly basis. The result is statistically significant at a 1% 
significance level. The percentage of insider ownership and the length of the 
Chief Executive Officer’s tenure have very little or nearly no impact in terms 
of financial performance. 
 In order to check the findings of this study, the author ran another 
regression. This time, the dependent variable was the return on average on 
equity (ROAE). 
ROAE = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CG-INDEX + 
β4_ INSIDER_OWN +β5_MARKETCAP + β6_TD/TA + µ 
 For a summary of the results, please see Table XX. The relationship 
did not change. The increase of the CG-Index by 1 point led to higher returns 
on equity with an average of 0.23% per year. The increase of a 10 or more 
member board of directors by 1 will lead to a decrease in the return on equity 
of up to 1.25% a year. The results are significant at 1% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. The relationship between the insider ownership levels and 
the tenure of the Chief Executive Officer are statistical insignificant and very 
low in terms of absolute values. 
 
Pooled OLS Regression 
 Following the results of the univariate and multivariate regression 
regarding the effect of corporate governance quality on the performance of the 
companies and the results of the univariate regression on the effect of 
institutional ownership on firm performance, we ran a Pooled OLS Regression 
to test the results. The results are summarized in Table XX. The number of 
observations was 404. The new variables included in the regression were the 
length of time that board members had remained directors (TENUREBRD) 
and the number of outside directors appointed to the board (NMOUTSIDER). 
Because this is a time series regression, a dummy variable was constructed for 
each year (D_2007-D_2011). 
ROAA = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CG-INDEX + β4_ 
INSIDER_OWN + 
β5_ INSTITUT_OWN + β6_ TENUREBRD + β7_ NMOUTSIDER + 
β8_MARKETCAP + β 9_TD/TA + µ 
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 The first regression was run with the Corporate Governance Index 
being part of it. The results showed that the CG-Index was significant at a 1% 
confidence level with a coefficient of 0.92%. This means that an increase in 
the score of Corporate Governance by 1 will lead on average to a 0.92% return 
on assets, which rises higher on an annual basis. Furthermore, the tenure of 
board members was statistically significant at 15 confidence level with a 
coefficient of 0.51%. This means that an increase in tenure of board members 
will lead to higher average return on assets. Confirming the findings of the 
univarite regression, the institutional ownership was significant at a 5% 
confidence level. The coefficient was very high at 2.86%, but the standard 
error was high as well, 1.48%. The coefficients are insignificant for insider 
ownership and board size. This strengthens the view that the constructed CG-
Index captures very important aspects of the corporate governance of REITs 
and that institutional ownership is a very influential tool in the performance of 
companies. 
 Furthermore, I perform a check by re-running the regression. But this 
time, we use the returns on equity as the dependent variable. 
ROAE = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CG-INDEX + β4_ 
INSIDER_OWN + 
β5_ INSTITUT_OWN + β6_ TENUREBRD + β7_ NMOUTSIDER + 
β8_MARKETCAP + β 9_TD/TA + µ 
 The CG-Index shot up to 3.29% and it was significant at 1% 
confidence level. The coefficient for the institutional ownership sky-rocketed 
to 17.43%, although it had a very high standard error of 7.10. The results were 
significant at 1% confidence level. The relationship was confirmed for the 
tenure of board members as well with a coefficient of 1.98%. The number, 
though much higher when compared with the findings of the returns on assets, 
certainly serve as a solid proof of the positive relationship that exists between 
specific aspects of corporate governance and institutional ownership and their 
effects on financial performance. 
 In the second regression, the CG-Index was split into three parts. 
ROAA = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CEO_CG-INDEX 
+ β4_ INSIDER_OWN + β5_ INSTITUT_OWN + β6_ TENUREBRD + 
β7_ NMOUTSIDER + β8_ WOMENBRD + β9_ STGRDBRD + 
β10_MARKETCAP + β11_TD/TA + µ 
 Female board members were captured by one variable 
(WOMENBRD). The choice of having a classified board of directors or not 
was on its own a different variable (STGRDBRD). Thus, the entrenchment of 
the CEO was under the CEO_CG-Index. All the above mentioned variables 
were dummy variables that took a value of 1 or 0. Hence, the results are 
summarized in Table IX. Institutional ownership was positively correlated 
with returns on assets. The coefficient stood at 2.88% and it was significant at 




5% confidence level. Yet, the standard error was 1.63 which scaled down the 
magnitude of the result. The tenure of board members was positively 
correlated with a coefficient of 0.41 and was statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. The presence of women on board led to an improvement in 
returns on assets of up to 0.99% a year. The result was statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level and the standard error was very little at 0.40. The 
presence of a staggered board was also positively related with the firm’s 
performance. REITs that opt for a classified board had an improvement of 
their returns on assets with 1.16%. Hence, the result was statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level. 
ROAA = α + β1_BRDSIZE + β2_CEO_TENURE + β3_CEO_CG-INDEX 
+ β4_ INSIDER_OWN + β5_ INSTITUT_OWN + β6_ TENUREBRD + 
β7_ NMOUTSIDER + β8_ WOMENBRD + β9_ STGRDBRD + 
β10_MARKETCAP + β11_TD/TA + µ 
 e 
 The author performed a check by re-running the regression. This time, 
he used the return on equity as the dependent variable. All the results held, and 
there was no change in terms of coefficient sign. Institutional ownership, 
presence of women on the board of director, and the length of time board 
members have remained in their positions were all statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. 
 
Robustness Tests 
 The author performed additional tests to check for potential sensitive 
variables to the model as well as to determine if any other variable may capture 
more explanatory effects. First, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance, 
the researcher saw the same relationship with the CG-Index and the 
institutional ownership. The reason such variable does not lead to major result 
is that the return on assets are interchangeable in one; and therefore, the variety 
is minimal. Using other control variables, such as dividend payout ratio and 
free funds from operations, often leads to no statistically significant changes 
in terms of results. 
 
Conclusion 
 The researcher examined 105 U.S. Equity Real Estate Investment 
Trusts for a period of 6 years from 2007 to 2013. It was discovered that for 
this sample, corporate governance had a positive and significant impact on 
financial performance. The variables that were used in the construction of the 
corporate governance index are the presence of women in the board of 
directors, the choice to have a classified board of directors or not, and the 
entrenchment of the CEO. This is the first study that uses the presence of 
women as a main indicator of the quality of corporate governance. 
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 Secondly, this paper finds that the presence of institutional holders has 
a positive impact on fund performance. The relationship is healthier for 
ownership levels between 30% and 50%. Differently from other studies, the 
researcher used the ownership level of the top 10 institutional holders and not 
the absolute value of the total institutional holders. 
 Further research must be done regarding the presence of females on 
the board of directors. The effect of institutional holders has been widely 
discussed. However, approaching it from innovative angles, such as the one 
used in this paper, can generate interesting insights. 
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Tabel I: Requirements to Qualify as a REIT 
 
The table provides a summary of the requirements from the legislation in the 
U.S. for a corporation to qualify as a REIT. These regulatory requirements 
are specific for this type of entity and differentiate them from other types of 
organizations. 
Regulation name Explanation 
  
Asset Test 
At least 75 percent of a REITs total assets must consist of 
real estate 
 
assets, cash and cash items, and U.S. government 
obligations. No more 
 
than 25 percent of the value of REITs total assets can be 
represented 
 
by securities of one or more taxable REIT subsidiaries; no 
more than 5 
 
percent of the REITs total assets can be invested in the 
securities of 
 
any one issuer; the REIT cannot hold more than 10 percent 
of the 
 
voting securities of any one issuer; and the REIT cannot 
securities 
 
representing more than 10 percent of the value of the 
securities of any 
 one issuer. 
 
Distribution Test 
 To qualify for tax treatment as a REIT, the deduction for dividends 
paid must equal or exceed the some of: a) 90 percent of the organization's real 
estate investment trust taxable income determined without regard to the 
dividends paid deduction and by excluding any net capital gain; and b) 90 





 A REIT must derive at least 75 percent of its gross income from rents; 
interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real property or interests in 
real property. A REIT must derive 95 percent of its gross income from 
dividends, interest, rents from real property, gains from sales of stock, 
securities or real property and income from foreclosure property. 
 A REIT must have 100 or more beneficial owners for 335 days of a 
full year or a proportionate number of days in a short year. It cannot be closely 
held, five or fewer individuals cannot own more than 50 percent in value of 




the outstanding beneficial interests in the organization at any time during the 
last half of any tax year. 
 
Table III (a): Summary Statistics 
 
 Summary description of the data used to analyze the performance of 
105 US Equity REITs during the year 2007. The information has been 
collected from the Annual Reports of the specific companies as well as the 
SNL database. All companies are publicly traded US Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. 





BRDSIZE 8,28 8,00 1,74 5,00 13,00 0,13 
NMOUTSIDER 7,11 7,00 1,67 4,00 11,00 0,21 
PCTOUTSIDER 85,50% 87,50% 6,21% 62,50% 100,00% -1,24 
TENUREBRD 9,74 9,00 3,90 2,00 24,00 0,79 
WOMENBRD 0,79 1,00 0,85 3,00 3,00 0,83 
TENUREWOMEN 5,38 4,00 5,27 0,00 19,00 1,16 
STGRDBRD 0,30 0,00 0,46   0,91 
CEO_AGE 55,90 56,00 8,31 34,00 81,00 0,42 
CEO_TENURE 8,92 8,00 6,13 0,00 26,00 0,55 
CEO_CHAIRMAN 0,39 0,00 0,50   0,46 
CEO_FOUNDER 0,10 0,00 0,31   2,62 
CEO_CHAIRMAN_FOUNDER 0,08 0,00 0,27   3,24 
ROAA 3,73% 3,27% 3,01% -1,32% 17,83% 1,46 
ROAE 12,88% 9,04% 22,48% -43,42% 173,74% 5,16 
MARKETCAP 2.929,02 1.543,13 3953,59 13,23 21.827,55 2,58 
TD/TA 0,54% 0,56% 0,20% 0,00% 0,94% -0,94 
INSIDER_OWN 7,56% 2,29% 0,12 0,25% 64,20% 2,82 
INSTITUT_OWN       
 
 
Table III (b): Summary Statistics 
 Summary description of the data used to analyze the performance of 
105 US Equity REITs during the year 2008. The information has been 
collected from the Annual Reports of the specific companies as well as the 
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SNL database. All companies are publicly traded US Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. 





BRDSIZE 8,28 8,00 1,74 5,00 13,00 0,13 
NMOUTSIDER 7,11 7,00 1,67 4,00 11,00 0,21 
PCTOUTSIDER 85,50% 87,50% 6,21% 62,50% 100,00% -1,24 
TENUREBRD 9,74 9,00 3,90 2,00 24,00 0,79 
WOMENBRD 0,79 1,00 0,85 3,00 3,00 0,83 
TENUREWOMEN 5,38 4,00 5,27 0,00 19,00 1,16 
STGRDBRD 0,30 0,00 0,46   0,91 
CEO_AGE 55,90 56,00 8,31 34,00 81,00 0,42 
CEO_TENURE 8,92 8,00 6,13 0,00 26,00 0,55 
CEO_CHAIRMAN 0,39 0,00 0,50   0,46 
CEO_FOUNDER 0,10 0,00 0,31   2,62 
CEO_CHAIRMAN_FOUNDER 0,08 0,00 0,27   3,24 
ROAA 2,18% 2,17% 3,40% -10,41% 14,18% -0,23 
ROAE 3,10% 6,56% 33,99% 
-
307,69% 53,64% -7,74 
MARKETCAP 2.284,15 1.209,68 3197,57971 11,28 18.826,18 2,86 
TD/TA 0,55% 0,58% 0,20% 0,00% 0,99% -1,03 
INSIDER_OWN 7,56% 2,29% 0,12 0,25% 64,20% 2,82 
INSTITUT_OWN       
 
Table IV: Institutional Ownership and its effect on Financial 
Performance 
 INSTITUT_OWN represents the percentage of shares owned by the 
top 10 institutional holders. INSTITUT_OWN > 50% is a dummy variable 
generated to incorporate the funds, where the top 10 institutional holders own 
more than 50% of the outstanding stock. . INSTITUT_OWN > 30% & 50% 
< is a dummy variable generated to incorporate the funds, where the top 10 
institutional holders own between 30% & 50% of the outstanding stock. 
INSTITUT_OWN < 30% is a dummy variable generated to incorporate the 
funds, where the top 10 institutional holders own less than 30% of the 
outstanding stocks. ROAA Average is the simple arithmetical average from 
the year 2009 to the year 2012. The results clearly indicated that an ownership 




level between the 30% and 50% bracket is associated with a much better 
financial performance as measured by the returns on average, with a 
difference more than double compared with concentrated institutional 
ownership levels below 30%. The evidence for concentrated institutional 
holders with levels higher than 50% is missing. It is only available for the 
year 2009 and that is much lower compared with the return on average for the 
funds where institutional ownership stands between 30% and 50%. 
 The information regarding the years 2007 and 2008 was not possible 
to be retrieved and therefore the analysis is restricted only to the years 2009, 
2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 ROAA 2009 ROAA 2010 ROAA 2011 ROAA 2012 ROAA Average 
INSTITUT_OWN 
> 50% na na na 1,92% na 
INSTITUT_OWN 
> 30% & 50% < 2,40% 1,63% 2,28% 3,73% 2,51% 
INSTITUT_OWN 
< 30% 1,08% 0,78% 1,23% 1,53% 1,16% 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
